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Abstract 
Emergence has a long and controversial history. In this paper we 
briefly review the primary strands of the debate, paying attention 
to its use in the fields of philosophy of science and mind, social 
science and systems theory including the theory of complex 
systems.  We argue that it is important to recognize why 
emergence in social systems is fundamentally different from other 
natural systems.  The key characteristics of reflexivity are 
discussed and a distinction between two classes of emergence 
proposed. Non-reflexive emergence: where the agents in the 
system under study are not self-aware, and Reflexive emergence: 
where the agents in the system under study are self-aware and 
linguistically capable. We specify the generative processes we 
believe are associated with each of these categories and argue for 
the adoption of this distinction in both theoretical and practical 
modeling of human social systems.    
Introduction   
The concept of emergence has become widely used within 
the social simulation community. The concept continues to 
be vaguely defined and to stand in for different 
propositions about social generative mechanisms. Within 
the social simulation community, the concept has focused 
primarily on upward causation (consistent with its usage 
within complex systems theory and associated research 
programs such as those into artificial life) (Sawyer, 2003). 
Few attempts have been made to reconcile this use of the 
concept with its wider philosophical use and with the 
parallel debates about the micro-macro link and the 
relationship between structure and agency within the social 
sciences.  Relatively little attempt has been made to 
identify the defining characteristics of human social 
systems and to critically re-examine the concept within this 
context.  Similarly derivative concepts such as downward 
causation and „immergence‟ (Castelfranchi, 1998b) have 
only recently begun to be explored in the simulation of 
human social systems. One current attempt to advance our 
understanding of upward and downward causation in social 
systems is the EU funded project Emergence in the Loop 
(EMIL). EMIL is concerned to explicate the mechanisms 
of emergence and immergence within the context of human 
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social systems by focusing on processes of „normative‟ 
self-organization. The aim is to contribute both to the 
conceptualization of emergence as well as to how social 
emergence may be meaningfully modeled.  
We argue that the ambiguity, opaqueness and lack of 
specification of the concept of emergence currently present 
a significant barrier to its application to the study of social 
systems.  Furthermore we argue that social systems 
represent a specific class of system, distinct from other 
natural systems where emergence may be studied.  This is 
due to the capability of human agents to distinguish „self‟ 
from „other‟ and in doing so reflexively distinguish and 
interact with their environment, greatly increasing the 
scope and complexity of the emergent structures which are 
possible. As a consequence we argue that both the form 
and mechanisms through which emergence occurs are not 
entirely analogous between natural and social systems. 
In this paper we review the historical and contemporary 
definitions of emergence, paying particular attention to its 
use in the fields of philosophy of science and mind, social 
science, general systems theory and complexity theory.  
This is followed by a discussion of the distinct 
characteristics of social systems and the implications of 
this difference for social simulation.  The key 
characteristics of reflexivity will then be discussed and a 
tentative framework will be proposed for two classes of 
emergence, specifically:   
 Non-reflexive emergence: where the agents in the 
system under study are not self-aware, and 
 Reflexive emergence: where the agents in the system 
under study are self-aware and linguistically capable. 
 
We then specify the generative processes associated with 
each of these classes.   
In proposing these two classes we do not preclude the 
distinction of other specific forms of emergence, but seek 
to highlight the need for differing approaches to the study 
of different system types, with a view to enhancing the 
explanatory power and applicability of the emergence 
concept to various system classes.   
A Brief History of the Concept of Emergence  
The notion of emergence has a long history, having been 
invoked in a number of disciplines with varying degrees of 
centrality to the theoretical and methodological 
development of associated fields.  The concept remains 
ambiguous and contentious, covering:  
…a wide spectrum of ontological commitments. 
According to some the emergents  are no more than 
patterns, with no causal powers of their own; for 
others they are substances in their own right… 
(Clayton, 2006: 14).  
 
The first explicit use of the concept has been attributed to 
George Henry Lewes, in 1875 (Ablowitz, 1939). Following 
Lewes the concept rose to prominence primarily within the 
philosophy of science but more recently can be seen to 
have been advanced within three distinct streams: 
philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind; systems 
theory, in particular complex systems; and social science 
where it has largely been referred to under the heading of 
the micro-macro link and/or the problem of structure and 
agency. Interestingly there has been relatively little cross 
influence between these streams. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to present a full comparison or to 
attempt a synthesis of the different streams, some brief 
comments are offered on the alternative perspectives and 
contribution of each to the wider debate.  
The Contribution from Philosophy of science 
The philosophy of science and philosophy of mind stream 
is arguably the oldest – some date it back to Plato 
(Peterson, 2006) but the debate is widely seen as having 
come to focus with the British Emergentists (Eronen, 2004; 
Shrader, 2005; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
2006). This school sought to deal with the apparent 
qualitatively distinct properties associated with different 
phenomena (physical, chemical, biological, mental) in the 
context of the debate between mechanism and vitalism: the 
former being committed to Laplacian causal determinism 
and hence reductionism and the latter invoking „non-
physical‟ elements in order to explain the qualitative 
difference between organic and in-organic matter. This 
stream remains focused on explaining different properties 
of classes of natural phenomena and with the relationship 
between brains and minds (See Clayton & Davies, 2006 for 
a recent summary of the positions). Peterson (2006: 695) 
summarizes the widely agreed characteristics of emergent 
phenomena within this stream as follows.  Emergent 
entities: 
1. Are characterized by higher-order descriptions (i.e. 
form a hierarchy). 
2. Obey higher order laws. 
3. Are characterized by unpredictable novelty. 
4. Are composed of lower level entities, but lower level 
entities are insufficient to fully account for emergent 
entities (irreducibility). 
5. May be capable of top-down causation. 
6. Are characterized by multiple realization or wild 
disjunction (Fodor, 1974) (alternative micro-states 
may generate the same macro states).  
 
A key concept is  supervenience: a specification of the 
„loose‟ determinisms held to apply between levels such 
that ‘…an entity cannot change at a higher level without 
also changing at a lower level’  (Sawyer, 2001: 556). 
Within this stream prominence of place is given to both 
downward and upward causation. Clayton and Davies 
(2006) specify downward causation as involving macro 
structures placing constraint on lower level processes 
hence ‘Emergent entities provide the context in which 
local, bottom up causation takes place and is made 
possible’ (Peterson, 2006: 697). This concept appears 
similar to that of „immergence‟ within the social simulation 
literature and is worth exploring a little more fully as it is 
otherwise absent within the approach to emergence typical 
of complex systems inspired approaches (Sawyer, 2003, 
2005).  
Davies (2006) argues that the mechanism of downward 
causation can usefully be considered in terms of 
boundaries. Novelty, he argues, may have its origin in a 
system being „open‟. If novel order emerges it must do so 
within the constraints of physics. He concludes: 
 … top-down talk refers not to vitalistic augmentation 
of known forces, but rather to the system harnessing 
existing forces for its own ends. The problem is to 
understand how this harnessing happens, not at the 
level of individual intermolecular interactions, but 
overall – as a coherent project. It appears that once a 
system is sufficiently complex, then new top down 
rules of causation emerge (Davies 2006: 48).  
 
For Davies then, top-down causation is associated with 
self-organization. For Davies it is the „openness‟ of some 
systems that „provides room‟ for self-organizing process to 
arise, but he concludes, ‘openness to the environment 
merely explains why there may be room for top-down 
causation; it tells us nothing about how that causation 
works.’ The devil then, is in the detail of the mechanisms 
specific to particular processes in particular contexts and 
particular phenomenal domains.  
The contribution from Social Science 
The micro-macro problem – the relationship between the 
actions of individuals and resulting social structures and 
the reciprocal constraint those structures place on 
individual agency – has long standing in social science. 
The problem is central to many social theories developed 
throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. Examples include: 
Marxian dialectical materialism (Engels, 1934) built upon 
by, among others, Vygotsky (1962) and Lyont‟ev (1978);  
the social constructionism of  Berger and Luckmann 
(1972); Gidden‟s structuration theory (1984); and the 
recent work of critical realists (Archer, 1998; Archer, 
Bhaskar, Ciollier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1997, 
1998). These alternative theories are frequently founded on  
differing assumptions, extending  from the essentially 
objectivist/rationalist theory of Coleman (1994), through 
the critical theories of Habermas and then to the radical 
constructivism of Luhmann (1990; 1995).  
Fuchs & Hofkirchner (2005: 33) classify into four 
categories the ontological position of alternative 
approaches to the micro-macro relationship. The majority 
of existing social theory, they argue, fall into one or other 
of the first two categories: individualism and sociologism. 
Neither of these „paradigms‟ provides a theoretical 
foundation which supports exploration, let alone advance 
understanding, of the interplay between agency and 
structure. The third category, dualism, was the target of the 
original emergentists. Only those theories categorized as 
dialectical therefore have relevance. Even here, it is 
reasonable to conclude that little practical advance has 
been achieved, as most positions result in a straddling of 
bottom up and top-down arguments and/or suffer from 
excessively vague conceptualisation. What has been 
largely agreed, despite the very different theoretical and 
often inadequate handling of this problem, is that structure 
and agency come together in activity or in bodyhood – the 
specific psycho-motor state at the instant of enaction. Both 
Vygotsky and Giddens, for example, focus on action as the 
point of intersection between human agency and social 
structures.  
The contribution from Systems Theory 
Systems language was clearly evident in the work of the 
early emergentists and in a great deal of sociology and 
anthropology – notably that of Margaret Mead and 
Gregory Bateson. However, „systems‟ as a focus of 
systematic research arguably took form with Bertalanffy‟s  
attempt to establish a General Systems Theory in 1950 
(Bertalanffy, 1950). As the science of „wholes‟ systems 
theory stands in contrast to reductionisms concern with 
parts. In many respects systems theory was put forward as 
a counter to what was perceived as excessive reductionism 
dominating scientific discourse during much of the 20
th
 
century. 
 While in the early stages of development of the theory, 
systems tended to be modeled as „black boxes‟ (effectively 
masking the relationship between micro and macro 
elements), the application of the concept to social science, 
in particular through the development of social cybernetics 
(Keeney, 1987) and soft systems approaches (Checkland, 
1988) provided a theoretical lense as well as methods 
useful for describing the systemic behavior of social 
systems. While the aspiration of GSM to establish a 
general science of systems is generally regarded to have 
failed (Jackson, 2000), systems approaches have 
contributed valuable methods for the study of the interplay 
between levels. The Systems view of emergence was 
founded on: 
 Holism; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
 A concern with feedback both positive and negative.  
 A concern with boundaries and boundary conditions.  
 
More recently the development of complex systems theory 
and its application to natural, social and cognitive 
phenomena has provided additional concepts upon which 
much current debate about emergence draws. Many of 
these concepts and methods have become  widely used 
within the multi-agent modeling community 
(Castelfranchi, 1998a; Gilbert, 1995; Holland, 1998).  
Within contemporary debate, and in contrast to the position 
taken by the British Emergentists who argued that 
irreducibility was the exception (Eronen, 2004), most real 
world systems are now argued to be non-linear (Kauffman, 
2000; Kauffman, 1993, 1996; Stewart, 1990). It is non-
linearity which contributes to these system‟s capacity for 
novelty and unpredictability in principle, through the  
presence of deterministic Chaos (Lorenz, 2001; Williams, 
1997) and/or equifinality. Equifinality as it is known 
within systems theory, or the principle of „wild 
disjunction‟ as it is known in philosophy,  refers to a 
system where a single high level property may be realized 
by more than one set of micro-states which have no lawful 
relationship between them (Richardson, 2002b, 2002a; 
Sawyer, 2001). As there is no a-priori basis by which the 
likely micro state can be determined, such systems are 
irreducible and unpredictable in principle.  
Summary 
The concept of emergence has led to the establishment of a 
number of general principles which describe the 
relationship between micro and macro phenomena, as well 
as some methods and techniques for identifying and 
exploring it.   Specifically, we can conclude that there are 
systems which: 
 are inherently analytically reducible (to which the 
concept of emergence does not apply); 
 are analytically reducible in principle but difficult to 
reduce in practice and/or where an advance in 
science/knowledge is needed for reduction to be 
possible because the results were „unexpected‟ 
(Chalmers, 2006) (to which the concept of „weak‟ 
emergence can be applied); 
 are not reducible in principle (to which the principle 
of „strong‟ emergence is relevant). 
To which of these three classes do human social systems 
belong? We argue it is always the latter and our reason for 
arguing this, and a discussion of the implications, are taken 
up below. In the end, there is no substitute for attempting 
to specify the mechanism.  In the following section we 
outline mechanisms fundamental to the emergence of 
social order and in so doing, attempt to clarify where and 
in what way these mechanisms rest on biology and differ 
from those which generate emergent order in non-human 
natural systems. Throughout the discussion, pointers are 
provided to where the mechanisms being outlined have, at 
least in part, been incorporated into computer simulations 
of artificial intelligence or artificial societies.  
Towards a specification of the Generative Processes 
Particular to Human Social Systems 
Our ontological starting position is that physics constrains 
chemistry; chemistry constrains biology and biology, 
sociality – in other words we advocate a form of 
naturalism. However, at each of these ontological levels, 
novelty occurs due to the emergence of unique macro-
configurations within the space of possibilities allowed by 
the lower level.  There is downward causation through the 
way in which higher order patterns change boundary 
conditions at lower levels and constrain the situation 
specific interactions that are possible. This suggests an 
instantaneous co-penetration of levels (synchronic 
emergence) and also a sequential one (diachronic 
emergence).  
The nature of the micro agents (their characteristics and 
action potentials), the heterogeneity and the structure of 
their relationships will influence the range and type of 
macro structures which can emerge. So far, though, there is 
nothing here that is not true of any other natural system in 
which there is the presence of non-linearity. What, then, 
are the fundamental characteristics of human agents, and 
what effect might the range and type of action potentials 
have on emergent social structures? 
Human agents are cognitive. Within the biological sciences 
human cognition is recognized as involving nervous 
system activity, where external perturbation on sensory 
surfaces results in a set of behavioral dispositions and 
responses to the environment. Like many animals, Humans 
form social systems by coordinating their behavior through 
reciprocal action. Unlike many other animals, Humans are 
capable of coordinating their coordination of action by way 
of language. The biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela developed a comprehensive theory of this 
process – the theory of autopoiesis (1980) and  
subsequently explored its implications for human social 
systems (Maturana, 1988a; Maturana, 1988b; Varela, 
1981; Varela, 1987; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1992).   
Elsewhere, we have argued that the theory of autopoiesis 
and its associated theory of enactive cognition is consistent 
with complex system ideas and that when combined with 
complexity, provides one possible pathway for 
understanding the substantive mechanisms of sociality 
(Goldspink & Kay, 2003b; Goldspink & Kay, 2003a). As a 
part of this work, we argued that social systems represent a 
distinct class of complex systems and that this difference 
was significant in terms of the range and type of emergent 
structures which it implied.  From this, two systemic 
mechanisms suggest themselves as the generative source of 
emergent patterns which we commonly refer to as social 
structures – the first of these is pre-linguistic (and by 
definition non-reflexive) and the second involves language 
and hence is reflexive (Gardenfors, 2006).   
Non-reflexive social emergence 
The pre-linguistic mode operates through the mechanism 
of structural coupling between agents. Structural coupling 
will arise between biological (autopoietic) agents which 
have sufficient cognitive range (behavioral repertoire) if 
they are located in a common environment.  Assuming that 
their phylogeny and ontogeny is such that they can co-exist 
through the process of recurrent mutual perturbation, each 
will adjust its structure so as to accommodate the other – 
their structures will become mutually aligned or 
structurally coupled. This process has been approximated 
in a simulation by Stoica-Kluver and Kluver (2006).  
An observer may notice regularities in the resulting 
patterns of interaction and these may be labeled as „norms‟ 
for example. These „norms‟ represent mutual 
accommodations, and an observer might attribute to those 
accommodations some social „function‟. The 
accommodations an agent makes to remain viable in one 
domain of interaction will need to be reconciled (within its 
body-hood) against accommodations being made 
(simultaneously) as it also participates with different 
agents in other domain/s in which it is simultaneously 
participating – agency and structure converge and are both 
instantiated at the point of enaction. The accommodations 
made will be those that allow the agent to remain viable 
and to maintain its organization (i.e. which „satisfice‟ the 
constraints and allow conservation of identity) based on its 
unique ontogeny (structure resulting from its history of 
interactions in a variety of domains).  
Here the emergent structure can be seen to be „in‟ (i.e. 
internalized within its own cognitive structure) each agent 
to the extent that each has had to make structural 
adjustments to operate in the shared domain. The structural 
adjustment each needs to make in order to  persist will, 
however, be unique – in other words the structural 
accommodations each has made in order to contribute to 
the patterns we are calling „norms‟ for example, will not be 
the same. The structure, then, can also be regarded as „in‟ 
the network, as it is the intersection of these disparate 
agent structures which gives it its particular form at a 
particular time. As any agent could leave the domain and 
have minimal effect on the resulting pattern, each agent‟s 
„contribution‟ will be relatively small. The pattern that is 
labeled as „norm‟ can be thought about as like a hologram. 
The whole is in every part (agent) such that removal of 
parts (agents) reduces the resolution (coherence) but does 
not constitute loss of overall pattern. However, the loss of 
too many components may reduce the coupling to the point 
that the existing pattern de-coheres and transforms into 
something different. Each agent contributes to the pattern 
formation, so it is conceivable that the pattern will only be 
realized with some critical minimal number of agents 
present which have had a sufficient mutual history to have 
aligned their structures (become socialized within that 
context).  As agents leave, the coherence may degrade 
until, beyond some critical point, it may de-cohere or take 
up an alternative „shape‟ due to the influence of external 
perturbations (acting through the remaining agents as 
points of intersection of domains), or to the entry of new 
agents with different ontogeny.  
Note that this emergence is consistent with that which we 
would observe between any complex natural systems – the 
emergent pattern is the product of local interactions only. 
This is relatively easy to model. While feedback from 
macro level to the micro is possible, it is only by means of 
effects of collective action on the environment and then the 
environment on the individual – i.e. downward causation.  
In natural systems, the local level interactions between 
agents are constrained by the existing structures of the 
agents and the state of their environment.  With biological 
agents the system is open in that any emergent structure is 
possible as long as it remains consistent with the biological 
viability of the agents as living (autopoietic) entities. This 
biological constraint includes limits to environmental 
conditions conducive to life (i.e. not too hot or too cold, the 
need for energy, limitations to sensory channels, channel 
bandwidths and affective/psychomotor response 
capabilities etc). These are primarily a product of 
phylogeny (the evolutionary history of the organism at the 
level of the species) rather than ontogeny (the history of 
development at the level of the individual), and are 
therefore slow to change and not under the control of the 
emergent social system. As a consequence the basic 
dimensionality of the phase space of the social system does 
not change over the time frame of interest for 
understanding social systems.  The dimensionality of the 
phase space is determined by the dimensions of variability 
possible by individuals – i.e. the plasticity of their nervous 
systems and by higher order dimensions which emerge 
from their interaction.  
Reflexive Social Emergence 
Our sensory surfaces are designed to detect difference in 
some dimension of the world and our cognitive apparatus 
is thus geared to make distinctions. Once our cognitive 
complexity exceeds a critical threshold (Gardenfors, 2006) 
these distinctions can be represented in language. Maturana 
and Varela (1980) describe language as involving the co-
ordination of the co-ordination of actions – i.e. language 
provides a meta process by which agents orientate 
themselves within a world. Structural coupling can arise 
purely through behavioral coordination of action (as 
discussed above), but it can also take place in and through 
linguistic exchange – the mutual co-ordination of co-
ordination of behaviors.  This gives rise to a consensual 
linguistic domain characterized by a more or less shared 
lexicon. This process has been simulated using both shared 
referents and simple structural coupling in the absence of 
objective referents (Gong, Ke, Minett, & Wang, 2004; 
Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 1995; Steels, 1997, 1998; Steels, 
2005; Steels & Kaplan, 1998; Steels & Kaplan, 1999), as 
has the emergence of a rudimentary grammar (Howell & 
Becker, n.d; Vogt, n.d). 
The advent of language radically increases the behavioral 
plasticity of agents and has significant implications for the 
dimensionality of the phase space and of the resulting 
higher order structures it can generate and support.  This is 
because language makes possible the emergence of 
domains of interaction which can themselves become the 
target for further linguistic distinction and hence new 
domains.  In other words, language allows the agent to 
make distinctions on prior distinctions (to language about 
its prior language or to build further abstractions on prior 
abstractions). This supports the possibility of infinite 
recursion and infinite branching (there are no doubt 
biological constraints on this in humans). Furthermore, a 
capacity to distinguish (label or categorize) processes 
supports reification and this simplifies the cognitive 
handling of processual phenomena and allows the resulting 
reifications to be treated by the agent in the same manner 
as material objects.  
These capabilities greatly expand the structural flexibility 
of the agents: they can now invent shared epistemic 
worlds. The phase space of agent cognition is now based 
primarily on constraints of ontogeny rather than phylogeny 
and is hence under the influence of the agent/s.  
Language makes possible a further major qualitative 
difference in natural and human social emergence.  
Humans (and possibly some other primates, cetaceans and 
elephants)
1
 have developed sufficient cognitive capacity to 
become self-aware and as such exhibit reflexive behavior.  
This occurs when the agent is capable of distinguishing 
„self‟ and „other‟ i.e. the agent can entertain the notion of 
„I‟ as a concept and treat that concept as an object. The 
advent of this capacity for reflexive identity also supposes 
the existence of a range of conceptual operators that act on 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that we can infer the existence of threshold effects 
here but cannot precisely specify the critical points of complexity at 
which self-awareness and language becomes possible. The ability for 
language is of course evident in species other than humans, but the degree 
to which their linguistic plasticity involves or enables reflexivity in the 
system is a subject for further research. 
identity – identity construction and maintenance becomes a 
part of the agent‟s world creation. This gives rise to what 
Gilbert has called second order emergence:  
second order emergence occurs when the agents 
recognize emergent phenomena, such as societies, 
clubs, formal organizations, institutions, localities and 
so on where the fact that you are a member or a non-
member, changes the rules of interaction between you 
and other agents. (Gilbert, 2002: 6).  
 
In other words, agents can now notice the patterns that 
arise as they interact with others and distinguish those 
patterns in language. For example, with the EMIL project 
which is concerned to understand the emergence and self-
regulatory role of social norms, a reflexive agent can notice 
an emergent pattern of social behavior and explicitly 
denote it as a „norm‟. While this denotation may be 
idiosyncratic (i.e. based on the necessarily limited 
perception of the individual agent), the agent can 
nonetheless act on the basis of this denotation.  Once 
distinguished and reified within a domain, agents can 
decide (on the basis of rational as well as value based or 
emotional criteria) how to respond – they can choose to 
ignore the norm or to behave in ways they believe will 
limit the reoccurrence of the behaviors that are outside the 
agreed/shared patterns of the group. Once a pattern has 
been distinguished in language it can make the transition to 
a rule – a formally stated, linguistically explicit 
requirement with stated conditionals and possible resources 
to maintain it. This suggests, for example, that an agent can 
form hypotheses about the relationship between a macro 
structural aspect of the social system in which it is a 
participant and then act on that hypothesis, potentially 
changing the structure which it participates in generating. 
This gives rise to a feedback path between macro and 
micro phenomena that is not present in any other natural 
phenomena.   
The recognition that agents possessing this cognitive 
complexity form the components of a social system sets up 
a distinct class of emergence.  This is on the basis that 
reflexive agents will display qualitatively different 
behaviors from non-reflexive through the ability to modify 
their own sets of behavioral change triggers.  For agents 
which have linguistic capability, the two processes 
(linguistic and non-linguistic) intertwine or even become 
one and would not be able to be empirically disentangled. 
Their respective influences will only be able to be 
examined through simulations or by comparing agents with 
different (phylogenetic) capabilities (i.e. different species). 
The Role of the Observer 
Another significant implication of the relationships 
described above is the observer dependant nature of 
emergence in social systems. In human social systems 
every agent is an observer and it is the process of 
observation and the associated distinction-making which is 
the reflexive engine of emergence. In natural systems, the 
agents of the system are unable to observe and distinguish 
linguistically or to distinguish external structures as 
separate from themselves hence the process of observation 
has no impact on the dynamics of the system or the way in 
which emergence takes place.  To some extent we can see 
an acknowledgement of this effect in methodological 
discussions within ethnography, action research (Carr & 
Kemmis, 1986) and grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990).  In each of these methodologies the impact of the 
researcher on the social system under study is 
acknowledged and seen as part of the process. The view 
being proposed here is that any agent that becomes a part 
of the system being observed has the potential to influence 
that system. An agent can become a part of the system 
simply by being itself observed or conceived as observing 
by those who constitute the system. In other words, the 
effect of the entry of a new observing agent is to change 
the system boundary so as to include that agent. The 
boundary is itself an entity of ambiguous status – it is an 
epistemic distinction albeit one based on potentially 
ontological markers. The most elegant handling of this 
concept we have encountered in the context of emergence 
is that of Alex Ryan (2006). In most social theory, positing 
the observer as a necessary part of the system removes any 
ontological privilege and threatens either infinite recursion 
or paradox. Based on the position advocated here, a degree 
of both  may well be fundamental to the type of system 
being described (Hofstadter, 2007). 
Implications for emergence 
Complex systems demonstrate a capacity to give rise to 
complex macro patterns as a result of local interactions 
between agents in highly connected webs. This local 
interaction can often be characterized as involving some 
signaling between agents. As we have seen above, in 
human social systems, this signaling behavior takes on a 
qualitatively different form. This has three key 
implications for our understanding of emergence that to 
date have largely been ignored by the literature. 
1. Social systems will display an increased range of 
emergent possibilities:  the reflexive nature of social 
systems implies that a greater range of emergent 
structures should be expected and they will be subject 
to more rapid change. 
2. Dimensions of phase space are non-constant:  As the 
agents in the social system define and redefine the 
phase space as a function of their reflexive 
distinctions they will create and change the 
dimensions of that phase space, in order to support 
their own viability in that space. 
3. Phase space comes under control of the system and is 
dynamic:  The dimensionality of the phase space 
associated with ontogenetic parameters is derived 
through the self-distinguishing characteristics of the 
agents and can be influenced by their situated 
behavior. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that the notion of emergence 
as it is currently discussed in the literature fails to consider 
that alternative generative mechanisms, and hence forms of 
emergence, apply to different classes of phenomena. 
Complex systems, artificial life and artificial societies 
currently model bottom up emergence and systems where 
top down influence operates only indirectly by downward 
propagation of constraint, not by more direct feedback. We 
have argued that this is not adequate for an understanding 
of human social systems. We have set out two mechanisms 
present in human social systems – non-reflexive and 
reflexive; suggested a suitable theoretical frame from 
which they may be considered – that of autopoiesis; and 
examined some of the implications these alternatives may 
have for the behavior of systems which support them. 
We have argued that autopoietic human agents display a 
qualitatively different range of behavioral possibilities 
brought about by their distinctive (biological) properties, 
primarily an advanced nervous system which supports the 
development of language and a capacity for reflexive self-
awareness. These broadened behavioral capabilities, in 
particular language, imply that the process by which 
emergence occurs in social systems is fundamentally 
different to that which is observed in other systems 
populated by non-linguistic agents.   
We suggest that this framework may support a more 
focused research program that doesn‟t unnecessarily mix 
different classes of system under the same 
conceptualization.  At the same time we acknowledge the 
possibility for yet further classes of emergence to be 
identified due to a current lack of understanding within the 
literature on the threshold points between system classes as 
they relate to emergence. We suspect, for example, that the 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of 
language identified by linguists may imply different 
mechanisms.  
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